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Survey: Competition Law and Fundamental Rights 





 This survey covers the following rights: right to a fair hearing and to an effective judicial 
remedy (Article 47, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights—hereinafter referred to as CFR); right 
to good administration (Article 41 CFR); tight to equal treatment, (Article 20 CFR); the 
presumption of innocence (Article 48 CFR); the principle of nulla poena sine lege (Article 49 
CFR); the right to privacy (Article 7 CFR). 
 In the Evonik Degussa appeal judgment the Court of Justice rules on the remit of the 
expectation of confidentiality concerning leniency documents and on the interplay between 
the right to privacy and the demands of transparency of the EU Commission’s action. 
 In the FSL judgment the Court of Justice ruled that the EU Commission is entitled to rely on 
information received by national tax authorities for the purpose of investigating a 
competition infringement, provided that the information was obtained in accordance with 
the applicable domestic procedural laws.  
  In the Janssen Cilag judgment the European Court of Human Rights examined the 
compatibility of the search-and-seizure powers, enjoyed by the French Competition 
Authority, with Article 8 ECHR (right to privacy and to the inviolability of the ‘home’), 
including the power to seize documents prima facie covered by legal professional privilege. 
 The issues arising from parent/subsidiary liability and the more general question of whether 
and in which cases antitrust liability should extend to non-cartel participants were addressed 
once again in E-Turas and in the Toshiba and AKZO Nobel appeals. 
 Roca Sanitario and Timab addressed issues of fairness and equal treatment in the 
assessment of fines, both in the context of infringement proceedings and in relation to 
settlement negotiations. 
 The scope of the right to be heard in merger cases was brought to the attention of the 




The purpose of this article is to briefly analyse developments in the case law of the EU Court of 
Justice concerning the application of human rights’ standards in the context of the enforcement of 
the EU competition rules that have occurred in 2016 and 2017.  As will be illustrated below, there 
have been a number of significant decisions handed down in this area, ranging from judgments 
ascertaining that the EU Commission and the EU Courts themselves had failed to determine whether 
there had been an infringement of the Treaty antitrust rules “within a reasonable time” to decisions 
elaborating on the meaning and scope of the presumption of innocence in complex cartel cases, to 
cases delving once again on issues of liability of parent companies for conduct of their own 
subsidiaries.  The Luxembourg courts have also continued to engage with the review of competition 
fines and in this context the Court of Justice has carefully redesigned the scope of its appellate 
jurisdiction vis-à-vis the General Court’s exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction in accordance with 
Article 23 of Council Regulation No 1/2003. Recent pronouncements have once again touched upon 
evidentiary issues, such as those arising from the complex relation between the demands of a “fair 
hearing” and the need to maintain the confidentiality of “delicate” documents, such as those 
                                                          
 Edinburgh Law School, University of Edinburgh.  The author gratefully acknowledges the feedback received 
by Dr Robert Lane on an earlier draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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submitted as part of a leniency application and questions arising from the exercise of the power to 
exchange of information within the European Competition Network (ECN). 
 
2. Issues of confidentiality of evidence: Evonik Degussa and FSL 
 
2.1. Between transparency and effective enforcement—leniency documents and infringement 
decision 
 
Maintaining the secrecy of leniency documents has been a key priority for the EU Commission as 
well as, generally, for all competition agencies since the establishment of whistleblowing 
programmes and was recognised by the Court of Justice itself in, among other decisions, the 
Pfleiderer preliminary ruling.1  It was held that without a commitment to maintaining the 
confidentiality of such statements, prospective applicants, on the one hand, would be deterred from 
coming forward with details on secret cartels and, on the other hand, the competition agencies 
would be deprived of a useful instrument for combating restrictive behaviour.2   This principle is not, 
however, absolute but may be limited on the basis of equally weighty interests, linked to ensuring 
that the right to obtain compensation for antitrust damages would remain “practical and effective.3 
           It is acknowledged that the 2014 Directive on Antitrust Damages has endeavoured to protect 
these statements in the course of proceedings pending before national courts by placing a blanket 
ban on their disclosure.  Nonetheless, this principle is only applicable to requests made during civil 
litigation in the member states.  Consequently, could an undertaking who has blown the whistle as 
regards a cartel with the EU Commission be able to oppose the outright disclosure, for instance, of 
parts of their application that are contained in the final infringement decision that is made public?  
           This is the question that the Court of Justice had to deal with in the Evonik Degussa case, 
concerning an appeal against the decision not to grant confidential treatment to information 
contained in a leniency application that had found its way into the published version of an 
infringement decision.4  In the judgment, the Court of Justice drew a distinction between “(…)the 
publication, in the form of verbatim quotations, of information from the documents provided by an 
undertaking to the Commission in support of a statement made in order to obtain leniency (…)” and 
that of “verbatim quotations from that statement itself”:5 whereas the former could be published 
even in the “non-confidential” version of the decision, after any reference to the source had been 
eliminate to satisfy requirements of confidentiality, the former would be protected outright from 
disclosure.6  It was explained that since the information published in the public, “extended” version 
of the infringement decision concerned only “the elements constituting the infringement of 
Article 101 TFEU” that had been ascertained as a result of the proceedings and did not therefore 
allow for the identification of the applicant, it would not have been protected from publication.7 
          The Court of Justice also took the opportunity to clarify the question of whether the right to 
privacy, enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights could 
reinforce the expectation of confidentiality held by leniency applicants vis-à-vis all or part of their 
statements. It was held that since the information being published was “(…)of direct relevance to the 
elements constituting the infringement” only, this fundamental right could not “prevent the 
disclosure of information which, like that whose publication is envisaged in the present case, 
concerns an undertaking’s participation in an infringement of EU law relating to cartels”.8  In the 
                                                          
1 Case C-360/99, Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt, [2011) ECR I-5161, para. 26. 
2 Id., para. 27; see also para. 24-25. 
3 Case C-536/11, Donau Chemie, [2013] ECR I-366, para. 23-24; see also para. 31-33.  
4 Case C-162/15P, Evonik Degussa v Commission, judgment of 14 March 2017, [2017] ECR I-2015. 
5 Id., para. 87. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Id., para. 96; see also para. 84. 
8 Id., para. 118. 
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Court’s view, the applicant could not rely on its right to privacy in order to “(…) complain of a loss of 
reputation which is the foreseeable consequence of his own actions. (…)”9 
         In light of the forgoing it is argued that with Evonik Degussa the Court of Justice has sought to 
define more sharply the scope of the legitimate expectation of confidentiality attached to leniency 
statements, by drawing a relatively neat distinction between extracts from such documents that 
allow for the identification of the applicant, and are therefore shielded from all disclosure in order 
not to jeopardise the effectiveness of the promise of immunity, and those who instead are “merely 
factual” and restricted to illustrating the key elements of a cartel.10 
           It is added that this approach is consistent with the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights concerning cases when an individual seeks to rely on the right to privacy as a means of 
avoiding the “loss of reputation” that stems from having committed a criminal offence. The 
Strasbourg court held in, inter alia, Gillberg v Sweden, that Article 8 of the Convention would not 
shield an individual from prosecution stemming from conduct that, e.g., contravened the applicant’s 
duties as public official, on the ground that in this case any criminal sanctions would be regarded as 
a “likely repercussion” of the applicant’s conduct on his or her reputation.11  
           Overall, it may be concluded that while leniency applicants are entitled to an expectation of 
secrecy as regards the content of statements made in order to seek immunity from fines, there are 
specific limits as to the scope of this entitlement: to the extent that protection from disclosure for 
leniency pleas is aimed at protecting applicants from the threat of civil liability, only statements that 
allow for their identification will be shielded from any disclosure.  The same, however, will not apply 
to elements of a leniency statement that only concerns “factual features” of cartel behaviour.  To 
hold otherwise would go as far as to protect the applicant from the foreseeable consequences of 
their unlawful conduct and thereby impinge upon other interests worthy of protection, such as, 
among others, the legitimate interest to the transparency of the EU Commission’s decision making. 
 
2.2. Which due process standards? Article 12 of Council Regulation No 1/2003 and the reach of 
the right to a “fair hearing” 
 
The powers enjoyed by the EU Commission and by each of the NCAs to exchange and use in 
evidence documents gathered in the course of competition investigations has raised significant 
questions as to the compatibility of this aspect of the decentralised enforcement of the Treaty 
antitrust rules with due process standards.  It has been argued that, although Regulation No 1/2003 
is predicated upon the “equivalent protection” of these rights across the Union as a whole,12 there 
are significant differences among the rules governing the taking of evidence in each jurisdiction as 
well as regards the admissibility of that evidence as a means of proving a competition 
infringement.13  It has been suggested that evidence is lawfully transmitted to a different NCA, and 
the latter can therefore rely on it as proof of a competition breach, if the agency charged with 
gathering it has complied with the rules on the taking and admissibility of documents and other 
evidentiary material in force in its own jurisdiction:14 this view is supported by the EU Commission 
itself.15  However, it has also been argued that allowing for the de facto “free flow of evidence” 
                                                          
9 Id., para. 117. 
10 Id., para. 84-85; see also Opinion of AG Szpunar, para. 121-123. 
11 Appl. No 41723/06, Gillberg v Sweden, judgment of 3 April 2012 (Grand Chamber), available on HUDOC at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-110144, para. 68-70.  Cf. Degussa, cit. (fn. 4), para. 83-84. 
12 See recital 16, Preamble to Council Regulation No 1/2003  of 16 December 2012, [2003] OJ L1/1. 
13 See e.g., inter alia Andreangeli, “The impact of the Modernisation regulation on the guarantees of due 
process in competition proceedings”, (2006) 31(3) ELRev 342, pp. 353-354. 
14 See e.g. Bloom, “Exchange of confidential information among members of the EU network of competition 
authorities”, in Ehlermann and Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2002: Constructing the 
Network of Competition Authorities (Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, Oregon, 2004), p. 389 at 399. 
15 Commission Notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities (hereinafter referred ti as 
Network Notice), [2004] OJ C/101/43, para. 27.  For commentary see e.g. Lage and Brokelmann, “The possible 
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within the ECN on the basis of a mere assumption that the safeguards of fairness and the rights of 
the defence can be regarded as “sufficiently equivalent” and without necessarily testing whether 
this is actually the case may lead to the “weakening” of important procedural guarantees.16   
        In the face of these concerns, it is not surprising that the recent FSL litigation, concerning the 
possibility for the Commission to use as evidence of a competition infringement documents received 
by domestic tax authorities would attract some attention.  The case concerned an appeal brought 
against the EU Commission decision finding the existence of a cartel on the Italian market for 
bananas.17 The applicant, one of the co-cartelists, challenged the infringement decision on the 
ground that, inter alia, the Commission had relied on evidence that had been transmitted to it by the 
Italian fiscal authorities: in the applicant’s view, since the documents in question had been gathered 
“solely” for the purpose of establishing a breach of the national tax rules, they could not then be 
deployed in EU competition proceedings to find an infringement of Article 101 TFEU.18  
       The General Court, however, rejected this plea: it was observed that since questions of 
admissibility of evidence gathered in the member states’ jurisdictions were regulated by national law 
and consequently, unless a domestic court had ruled the taking of such evidence as unlawful, the EU 
judicature could not regard that evidence as inadmissible without violating the confines of its own 
jurisdiction.19  The judgment acknowledged that the rights of the defence of the investigated parties 
belonged to the general principles of EU law and should therefore be observed by the EU 
Commission throughout its proceedings.20  However, the General Court took the view that the scope 
of these rights should have been determined in the broader context of Council regulation No 
1/2003, whose overarching aim was to put an end to the “centralised” enforcement of Articles 101 
and 102 by promoting the “close cooperation “ of the Commission and the national authorities.21 
             In light of the forgoing, the General Court took the view that the Commission had acted 
within the remit of its powers when it had relied on evidence received by the Italian tax authorities 
in the course of its competition enforcement proceedings.  While the goal of Article 12 was to 
regulate the “flow of information” among the members of the ECN by setting out certain minimum 
requirements governing the use of that information, such as the stipulation that evidence so 
obtained could not be used for a purpose other than the enforcement of the Treaty competition 
rules,22  the same provision could not be read as to provide a general ban on “(…) the use as 
evidence, by the Commission, of information obtained by another national authority in exercise of 
its tasks.”23   Unless the applicant could have shown that a national court had ruled the documents 
at issue as inadmissible, according to the applicable national rules, the Commission could have relied 
on them in its competition proceedings without infringing the applicant’s rights of defence.24  
      It is suggested that the FSL judgment was not entirely surprising since it confirmed both the 
ongoing commitment to the principle of national autonomy as regards the determination of 
questions of admissibility of evidence, as well as emphasising the need to uphold the full effect of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
consequences of a relatively broad scope for exchange of confidential information on national procedural law 
and antitrust sanctions”, in Ehlermann and Atanasiu (eds), cit. (fn. 14), p.405 at 412; cf. Bloom, cit. (fn. 14), p. 
398-399. 
16  See e.g. Waelbroeck, “ ‘Twelve feet dangling down and six necks exceeding long’. The EU network of 
competition authorities and the European Convention on Fundamental Rights”, in Ehlermann and Atanasiu 
(eds), cit. (fn. 14), p. 465 at 483; see also, inter alia Andreangeli, cit. (fn. 13), pp. 354-356. 
17 Case T-655/11, FSL and others v Commission, [2015] ECR II-383. 
18 Id., para. 41. 
19 Id., para. 45-46. 
20 Id., para. 50. 
21 Id., para. 75. 
22 Id., para. 76, 78. 
23 Id., para. 78. 
24 Id., para. 81-82. 
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Article 12 of the Modernisation Regulation.25 However, it could be argued that, by “leaving it to 
national law” to define the exact confines of the power to exchange and use as evidence information 
gathered in other jurisdiction, it seems to stoke up concerns that resorting to this form of 
cooperation could lead to uncertainty—if not to the weakening of—as regards the standards of 
protection to be afforded to important due process rights, such as the right against self-
incrimination, whose scope may well vary from one jurisdiction to another.26 
           The decision was appealed and on 17 November 2016 AG Kokott delivered her opinion which 
confirmed the conclusions of the General Court.27  She expressed the view that “(…) the existence of 
an antitrust offence can be demonstrated by any appropriate evidence”.28  Thus, unless certain 
forms of proof are expressly excluded, either because they had been obtained in disregard of an 
essential procedural requirement aimed at safeguarding the investigated parties or had been 
deployed for an unlawful purpose, there should be no limit to the ability of the Commission or of the 
NCAs to rely on any evidence in order to establish the breach of the EU competition rules.29  On this 
basis, the Advocate General, concurring with the General Court, expressed the view that because 
the transmission of the evidence in issue had neither been prohibited by the competent national 
courts nor gathered by the competent authorities in defiance of a “prohibition on use”, the 
Commission had been fully entitled to include the documents in issue in the file.  In her Opinion, she 
stated that Article 12 should not be read as implying that “the only evidence that may be used in 
antitrust proceedings is that which has already been gathered for the purposes of such 
proceedings”.30  To hold otherwise would not only unduly impair the effectiveness of the 
cooperation rules but would also impair the scope of the principle of national autonomy.31  On this 
basis, AG Kokott expressed the view that since there was no reason to conclude that the standards 
under which the Italian Tax authorities had gathered the affected evidence were any less stringent 
than those available to the investigated parties under EU competition law,32 the Commission had not 
infringed the limits of its powers under Article 12.33  
       On 27 April 2017 the Court of Justice handed down its judgment, which upheld the first instance 
decision: the Court, agreeing broadly with the AG’s Opinion, held that “(…) Article 12 of Regulation 
No 1/2003 pursues the specific objective of (…) encouraging cooperation between the authorities 
within the European Competition Network by facilitating the exchange of information” and for that 
purpose conferred on the Commission and its domestic partners “(…) the power to provide one 
another with, and use in evidence, any matter of fact or of law, including confidential information 
(…)”.34  It therefore refused, as the Advocate General had done, to read into this provision “(…)a 
more general rule preventing the Commission from using information transmitted by national 
authorities other than the Member States' competition authorities on the sole ground that that 
information was obtained for other purposes.”35  It was therefore concluded that since the evidence 
                                                          
25
 See e.g, mutatis mutandis, Rizzuto, “Parallel competence and the power of the EC Commission under 
Regulation 1/2003 according to the Court of First Instance”, (2008) 29(5) ECLR 286 at 289-290. 
26
 See inter alia Andreangeli, cit. (fn. 13), p. 351-352, 363; also, mutatis mutandis, Rizzuto, “The procedural 
implication of Pfleiderer for the private enforcement of European Union competition law in follow-up actions 
for damages”, (2011) GCLR 116, pp. 118-120. 
27 Case C-469/15, FSL v Commission, Opinion of AG Kokott, 17 November 2016. 
28 Id., para. 31. 
29 Ibid.; see also para. 32. 
30 Id., para. 47; see also para. 35. 
31 Id., para. 46. 
32 Id., para. 50. 
33 Id., para. 51; see also para. 62. 
34 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 April 2017, not yet reported, para. 34. 
35 Id., para. 35. 
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being transmitted had been gathered in compliance with the relevant national law36 and the 
investigated parties had been able to rely fully on their right to be heard and have access to the 
Commission’s file after the notification of the statement of objections,37 the Commission had not 
acted outside the limits of the powers conferred to it by Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003.38 
       It is submitted that the importance of the FSL judgment cannot be understated.  It is argued that 
both AG Kokott’s Opinion and the Court of Justice’s conclusions disclose a clear “enforcement 
driven” approach to the rules governing the exchange and use as evidence of documents gathered 
by the members of the ECN.  While the interpretation of Article 12 adopted in FSL  is likely to boost 
arguments in favour of adopting a proactive stance to the investigation of new prima facie 
competition infringements, it nonetheless leaves open long-standing questions as to the extent to 
which it may strike an appropriate balance between the demands of deterrence of new antitrust 
breaches and the need to afford adequate protection to the rights of the defence and more widely 
of the right to a “fair trial” in competition cases at EU level.   
 
2.3. Search and seizure powers in competition investigations: the European Court of Human 
Rights speaks once again 
 
The question of human rights’ compatibility of the search and seizure powers that the EU 
Commission and its national partners enjoy in competition investigations has been a vexed one. 
According to long-standing CJEU’s jurisprudence, the power to inspect premises of undertakings 
reasonably suspected of having infringed the competition rules and in that context to seize any 
documents, including those in electronic form remains consistent with the right to the inviolability of 
the undertaking’s “home”, provided by Articles 7 of the EU CFR and 8 of the ECHR on the ground 
that the legislative framework enshrined in Articles 18 and 20 of Council Regulation No 1/2003 
provides sufficient protection of the investigated parties against “arbitrary or disproportionate 
intervention” by the EU Commission.39  Furthermore, the EU acquis confers to the concerned 
undertakings a limited right to the confidentiality of communications with their legal advisers, on 
condition that the latter are independent and authorised to practice in one of the member states 
and the communications in issue concern the exercise of the undertaking’s rights of defence.40 
            Having regard to the legality of search and seizure powers, the Court of Justice observed in 
inter alia the Dow Benelux judgment that the Commission could only order such measures upon a 
“reasonable suspicion”, was obliged to provide adequate reasoning in its decision or authorisation 
and in that context had to justify the proportionality of the scope of the measure vis-à-vis the remit 
of the investigation.41  It further added that the parties affected by the search and seizure enjoyed 
the right to legal representation and could appeal the decision ordering the investigative measure.42  
The Court concluded that even in the absence of a judicial authorisation for such a search, the 
Commission’s powers remained consistent with entitlements to privacy and inviolability of private 
premises.43    In addition, should domestic law require that the competition authorities aiming to 
search private premises seek a judicial authorisation in national courts, the latter will be entitled to 
carry out a review of the “authenticity” of the decision adopted by the EU Commission for this 
purpose and to decide whether the inspection is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate in light of the 
                                                          
36 Id., para. 32. 
37 Id., para. 44; see also para. 40 and 42. 
38 Id., para. 42, 45-46. 
39 Ortiz Blanco (ed), EU Competition procedure, 3rd edition, 2013, OUP, p. 320. 
40 Case 155/79, AM & S Europe v Commission, [1982] ECR 1575, paras. 18-27; also case T-125/03, AKZO Nobel 
and others v Commission, [2007] ECR II-3523, para. 79 ff. 
41 Case 99/87, Dow Benelux and others v Commission, 1989] ECR 3137, para. 26. 
42 Id., para. 17.  See also, mutatis mutandis, case 46/87, Hoechst v Commission, [1989] ECR 2985, para. 29-30. 
43 Case 99/87, cit. (fn. 41), para. 18; also case T-125/03, cit. (fn. 40), para. 27. 
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subject matter of the case.44  Nonetheless, the domestic court cannot question the “necessity” of 
the measure or ask for access to the case file, although it can seek “further explanations” from the 
Commission, especially as regards the “reasonable suspicion” prompting the inspection,45  it being 
only for the EU Courts to review the validity of the measure ordering the investigative measure.46 
        Similar questions have also arisen in individual member states, making their way to the 
European Court of Human Rights.47  In Janssen Cilag v France, decided in March 201748  the applicant 
had alleged that the French competition agency had infringed its right to privacy by entering its 
premises and seizing documents, some of which were in electronic format,49  by carrying out a 
“fishing expedition” and taking away communications with the investigated party’s lawyers.50   
Following an appeal to the competent court (the Court of Appeal in Paris), the applicant petitioned 
the Human Rights Court: the Court however found no infringement of Article 8 of the Convention.  It 
held that the French competition authority had acted in a manner that was both consistent with the 
applicable domestic law and proportionate to the legitimate aim that the latter pursued.51 In its 
view, the decision ordering the search had set out clearly its scope and its implementation had been 
assisted by several safeguards, including the right to have a lawyer present at the inspection and the 
possibility to appeal the decision ordering the inspection and the seizure of documents.52   
           As to the allegation that the measure in issue had infringed the applicant’s right to lawyer-
client confidentiality, the Strasbourg Court observed that the assessment of the nature—whether 
privileged or otherwise—of documents seized in the course of on-the-spot inspections could only 
occur ‘after the event’ and that, to comply with the ECHR, could only be carried out by a judge who 
had to be allowed to assess the nature of the communications and the overall proportionality of the 
scope of the seizure vis-à-vis the remit of the investigation and to order the restitution of any 
privileged evidence.53  In light of the forgoing the Human Rights Court, in rejecting the plea, held 
that, on the one hand, the applicant’s representatives had been able to contest the nature of the 
documents to prevent their taking and to highlight those that in their view were privileged.54 And on 
the other hand the court had engaged in a careful and extensive examination of the documents in 
respect of which legal privilege had been claimed and could have ordered their restitution, had they 
been so protected.55 
        It is submitted that the Janssen Cilag judgment appears to confirm much of the existing acquis 
concerning the human rights’ compliance of the inspection powers enjoyed by competition agencies 
due the emphasis it placed on the need to look at the whole set of procedural safeguards assisting 
these measures and aimed to protect the position of the investigated parties.56  It is also suggested 
that this decision is going to “reassure” the EU Commission: having regard especially to issues of 
legal professional privilege, it is argued that the current procedural arrangements enshrined in the 
AKZO Nobel judgment, which oblige the Commission to place any “contested” documents in a sealed 
envelope so that a decision on their status can be taken by the General Court,57 are likely to comply 
with the interpretation of Article 8 ECHR adopted in Janssen by the European Court of Human 
                                                          
44 Case C-94/00, Roquette Freres, [2002] ECR I-9011, para. 49, 52. 
45 Id., para. 52 and 61; see also Article 20(8), Council Regulation No 1/2003. 
46 Roquette Freres, cit. (fn. 44), para. 67-68. 
47 See e.g. appl. No 37971/97, Colas Est v France, [2004] 39 EHRR 17, especially paras. 48-49. 
48Appl. No 33931/12, Janssen Cilag SA v Commission, judgment of 21 March 2017, not yet reported. 
49 Id., para. 14. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Id., para. 19; see also para. 23. 
52 Id., para. 20-21. 
53 Id., para. 19. 
54 Id., para. 21-22. 
55 Id., para. 22-23. 
56 Ibid.; for commentary, see inter alia Ortiz Blanco, cit. (fn. 39), pp. 320-322. 
57 Case T-125/03, cit. (fn. 40), para. 79-83; see also para. 87-89. 
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Rights, to the extent that only the Luxembourg first instance judges can examine these documents 
and decide whether they can be included in the case file.58 
 
3. Liability for actions of third parties and its interplay with the presumption of innocence 
 
3.1. Parent/subsidiary relations and EU competition sanctions: who pays?  
 
The most recent court practice has also had to deal with ongoing questions arising from the 
application of the notion of “single economic entity” for the purpose of determining the identity of 
the undertaking liable for the penalties imposed as a result of a competition infringement.  This is an 
area that has attracted significant controversy: it is recognised that the presumption that a parent 
company should be liable for the consequences of a breach of the competition rules committed by 
its 100%-owned subsidiary, unless it could be shown that it could exercise no “decisive influence” on 
the latter, is now well-established. 59 Nonetheless, questions as to whether this principle would be 
compatible with human rights safeguards such as the rule that “criminal” liability be personal have 
continued to emerge.  This appears to be the case especially when the parent company may hold a 
shareholding of less than 100%--perhaps together with a co-owner—into the capital of a company 
that has infringed the competition rules.60   
         In the recent Degussa case, the Court of Justice held that it is incumbent on the EU judiciary 
“(…) when it examines whether the presumption of actual exercise of decisive influence is rebutted, 
[to] take into consideration all the evidence submitted to it”,61 in light of, inter alia, the “existence of 
a specific instruction” relayed to the subsidiary would be relevant, even when the subsidiary did not 
in fact fully adhere to the parent company’s orders.62  These principles have recently been reiterated 
by the Court of Justice in its judgments concerning, respectively, the Toshiba and the AKZO Nobel 
(Re: Heat Stabilisers Cartel) appeals.  In the AKZO judgment63 the Court of Justice examined whether 
the circumstance that “the Commission’s power to impose penalties is time-barred in relation of 
certain subsidiaries” may in any way affect the liability for fines imposed on their parent company.64    
In Toshiba  the Court of Justice,65 after reiterating that the existence of the liability of a parent 
company for actions imputable to its subsidiary should be dependent upon an assessment of “all the 
relevant factors relating to the economic organisation and legal links” within the corporate group in 
consideration,66 examined how these principles should apply in a situation where the subsidiary that 
had been directly responsible for anti-competitive behaviour was jointly owned by two distinct 
undertakings.67   
          The Court of Justice held that if it emerged from “the statutory provisions or contractual 
stipulations governing” the subsidiary in question that its action on the market was “determined 
jointly by its parent companies”, it would have been reasonable to conclude that the latter had 
exercised a joint, decisive influence over the subsidiary,68 unless the parties could adduce evidence 
to disprove the existence of such influence.69  In this context, the fact that one of the parent 
companies had in fact never exercised certain aspects of such “decisive influence”, by relying on, 
                                                          
58 Id., para. 82-85. 
59 See inter alia case C-97/08 P, Akzo Nobel v Commission, [2009] ECR I-536, e.g. para. 58 ff. 
60 See inter alia case C-179/12 P, Dow Chemical Co v Commission, [2013] ECR I-605, para. 53-55. 
61 Case C-155/14, Evonik Degussa v Commission, [2015] ECR I-529, para. 39. 
62 Id., para. 40-41. 
63 Case C-516/15 P, Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission, judgment of 27 April 2017, not yet reported. 
64 Id., per AG Wahl, opinion of 21 April 2016, not yet reported, para. 49. 
65 Case C-623/15 P, Toshiba v Commission, judgment of 18 January 2017, not yet reported. 
66 Id., para. 66. 
67 Id., para. 48. 
68 Id., para. 51. 
69 Id., para. 52. 
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e.g., any veto rights over key decisions of the subsidiary, could not have been read as altering in any 
way the conclusion that it could significantly affect the action of its subsidiary on the market.70 
          In the AKZO Nobel appeal, the Court of Justice confirmed the General Court’s decision and took 
the view, just as AG Wahl had done in his opinion, 71  that the liability of the parent company in these 
circumstances should be regarded as “derivative”.72 In other words, according to the Court of 
Justice, since “the parent company's liability arises from its subsidiary's unlawful conduct, which is 
attributed to the parent company in view of the economic unit formed by those companies”, it 
remains “inextricably linked” to the subsidiary’s behaviour.73 In order to assess the existence or 
otherwise of this “derivative liability”, regard must be had to the circumstances of the case and in 
particular to whether the parent company had in fact had the opportunity to exercise decisive 
influence on the conduct of the subsidiary in the time in which the infringing practices had been 
implemented or had participated directly in them.74 
         On this basis, the Court acknowledged that “(…) in a situation in which no factor individually 
reflects the conduct for which the parent company is held liable, the reduction of the amount of the 
fine imposed on the subsidiary jointly and severally with its parent company must, in principle, (…) 
be extended to the parent company”.75  However, it also observed that there may be cases in which 
the Commission, even though it may have been precluded from sanctioning a subsidiary due to the 
lapse of time, could still inflict financial penalties on the parent company.76 On this basis, the Court 
of Justice concluded that AKZO Nobel could be sanctioned for a competition infringement that was 
prima facie imputable to its subsidiary, even though the Commission’s powers had been time barred 
vis-à-vis the latter.77   
           The Court emphasised that AKZO, as parent company, had participated to the implementation 
of the initial stages of the cartel and, even after taking a more “passive role”, it had exercised 
“decisive influence” over its subsidiary in later phases of the cartel’s operation.78  Thus, it held that 
AKZO’s liability could not be excluded merely on the ground that the Commission had been time-
barred from sanctioning its subsidiary: in the Court’s view, “(…) factors specific to the parent 
company may justify assessing the parent company’s liability and that of its subsidiary differently, 
even if the liability of the former is based exclusively on the unlawful conduct of the latter.”79 It 
followed that, to the extent that AKZO had participated to the first infringement of Article 101 TFEU 
“of its own accord” and had thereafter remained involved in other aspects of the collusive practice 
as part of the same “economic unit” as its subsidiaries, it could have been sanctioned by the EU 
Commission, even though the latter could no longer inflict penalties on the other companies due to 
the lapse of time.80  
          It is suggested that the Opinion in AKZO and the appeal decision in Toshiba are of considerable 
significance in the Court of Justice’s approach to the joint and several liability of parent and 
subsidiary companies.  In respect to the former, it is argued that the Court of Justice has gone some 
way toward defining the implications of the “derivative liability” of parent companies vis-à-vis action 
of their subsidiaries, by suggesting a framework for the assessment of its scope, in light of the 
circumstances of the case.81  As regards the Toshiba judgment, it is suggested that this decision 
                                                          
70 Id., para. 72-73. 
71 Case C-516/15 P, Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission, Opinion of AG Wahl of 21 December 2016, not yet 
reported, para. 66. 
72 Case C-516/15 P, judgment of 27 April 2017, para. 61. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Id., para. 64-67. 
75 Id., para. 62. 
76 Id., para. 63; see also para. 71-72. 
77 Id., para. 71. 
78 Id., para. 72-73. 
79 Id., para. 74. 
80 Id., para. 75. Cf. AG Wahl’s Opinion, paras. 82-86. 
81 See paras. 71-76 of the judgment; cf. per AG Wahl, para. 69, 86. 
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confirms the need to carry out an objective assessment of the existence of the ability of the parent 
to exert decisive influence over the subsidiary, in light of, inter alia, any contractual provisions 
governing the corporate relationships within a specific corporate group.82   
         It may therefore be concluded that the Court of Justice seems to have become increasingly 
aware of the need to engender greater clarity as regards the applicability of this derogation from the 
principle that liability from fines be “personal” to the infringer.  By emphasising the importance of 
carrying out a careful judicial scrutiny of the effective nature of the links between parent companies 
and subsidiaries the Court of Justice appears to have become more attuned to the need to lay out 
carefully defined boundaries around the scope of the “derivative” liability of parent companies, so 
that the need to punish effectively individual infringers does not unduly hamper the continuing 
observance of principles of fairness. 
 
3.2. Non-competitor cartel liability: when can an “intermediary” be held responsible for a 
competition infringement? The E-Turas ruling 
 
Parent-subsidiary liability is not the only area in which the Court of Justice has had to address 
questions relating to the extent to which the consequences of complex anti-competitive practices 
should be attributed to undertakings different from the actual infringers of the EU antitrust rules.  
Similar issues can also arise when cartel members may have relied on the “services” of a third party 
in the implementation of an anti-competitive arrangement as in the recent E-Turas preliminary 
ruling.  The EU Court of Justice was asked to decide whether an online travel agent, whose 
information system had been used by travel agents in order to, inter alia, agree that discounts on 
travel packages should be capped and to give effect to that decision by modifying the affected 
prices, should also be regarded as having breached Article 101 TFEU83 if it had “despatched” the 
message in the course of its economic activity.84 In particular, would it be compatible with the 
presumption of innocence to reach such a conclusion without first ascertaining the existence of 
sufficiently “objective and consistent” indicia and other evidence confirming that the undertaking in 
question had been aware or ought to have been aware of the content of the message?85  
        The Court of Justice acknowledged that if an undertaking had remained “active in the market” 
after having participated in a collusive strategy that involved the exchange of secret information it 
could be concluded that they had participated in the implementation of the restrictive practice.86  
Nonetheless, it took the view that if on the other hand, the undertaking had only “despatched” a 
message among cartel members, without being active on the same market as them, such conduct 
could not on its own be regarded as constituting sufficient evidence that the applicant knew or 
ought to have known of the collusive behaviour adopted by the travel companies87 without 
infringing the general principle of the presumption of innocence.88  
          Thereafter, the Court considered the issue of whether this general principle could be respected 
if a similar inference had been drawn in the presence of other “indicia” that were consistent with the 
finding that the online operator in question had known of the content of the message and had had 
the possibility to rebut that conclusion.89  The Court’s answer was affirmative: it was held that the 
presumption of innocence would have been respected if the travel agents were allowed to show 
that they either had not received the message or had not read it at all or after a long time had 
                                                          
82 Case C-623/15 P, cit. (fn. 45), para. 66; see also para. 48. 
83 Case C-74/14, E-Turas and others, [2016] ECR I-42; see e.g. para. 26. 
84 Id., para. 29. 
85 Id., para. 38; see also para. 33-34. 
86 Id., para. 33; see also para. 36. 
87 Id., para. 34. 
88 Id., para. 39-40. 
89 Id., para. 40. 
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passed since the message had been relayed90 on the ground that in these circumstances it could not 
be established that the company in issue had been aware of the content of the instruction.91  
          Importantly, the Court affirmed that a similar conclusion could have also been reached if the 
undertaking in question had “publicly distanced” itself from the proposed collusive course of 
action:92 nonetheless, it clarified that the manner in which such “public distancing” had taken place 
should have been assessed on the basis of the circumstances of the case and of the nature of the 
practice at issue.93  Alongside a “public declaration” or “reporting to the authorities”, other conduct, 
such as, inter alia, “sending an objection” to the system’s administrator or even consistently 
adopting a policy that was incompatible with the concerted ceiling on discounts could have 
constituted suitable evidence of such “distancing”, in light of the features of the case.94 
          It is submitted that the E-Turas decision sheds further light on the role and scope of the 
presumption of innocence in the context of proving the existence of a competition infringement, 
especially when the conduct of the undertakings concerned forms part of a “complex” arrangement 
that often does not involve any direct contact between the participants.  It is argued that the 
possibility for an undertaking to rebut any presumption as to its involvement in a cartel, in particular 
when its involvement was shown to be “marginal” is a key factor in ensuring that an appropriate 
balance is struck between the principle of effectiveness and the demands of fundamental rights’ 
protection which in turn require respect for the presumption of innocence.  In this specific respect, 
the Court of Justice’s clear commitment to assessing the nature of the “public distancing” in light of 
all the features of each case is consistent with this principle and contributes, more broadly, to the 
meaningful protection of the right to a “fair procedure” enjoyed by undertakings affected by 
competition investigations. 
 
4. Current approaches to the right to a “fair hearing”: the right of access to the EU Commission 
file, to have a case decided within a “reasonable time” and the judicial review on 
competition fines 
 
4.1. The UPS case: defining the scope of the right to be heard in merger cases 
 
The right to be heard and to be able to present one’s own case in the course of competition 
proceedings is long established in EU law: grounded in the general principle of ‘audi alteram 
partem’,95  it now finds a constitutional backing in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
namely the rule guaranteeing the right to a “good administration”.96  As such, this right encompasses 
the entitlement to, inter alia, receive a statement of the allegations of anti-competitive behaviour 
made by the EU Commission against the investigated undertaking, to put forward objections and 
defences against the Commission’s case and for this specific purpose, to access the “case file”, i.e. all 
the evidence, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, gathered by the investigating officials.97  Pivotal to 
the effective exercise of the right to be heard is the statement of objections, since it delimits the 
scope of the administrative procedure initiated by the Commission” and therefore prevents it from 
“relying on other objections” with a view to finding a competition infringement.98  Although it has 
                                                          
90 Id., para. 41. 
91 Id., para. 45; see also para. 43. 
92 Id., para. 46. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Id., para. 47-48. 
95 See e.g. case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission, [1974] ECR 1063, para. 15). 
96 See inter alia case C-469/15, FSL Holding Ltd v Commission, Opinion of AG Kokott, 17 November 2016, not 
yet reported, para. 37; also case C-268/14 P, Italmobiliare SpA v Commission, Opinion  of AG Wahl, [2015] ECR 
I-697, para. 34. 
97 See e.g. case C-413/06 P, Impala v Commission, [2008] ECR I4951, para. 61; see also para. 63, 66. 
98 Id., para. 63. 
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been recognised that this document is “preparatory” in nature and can therefore be modified in the 
course of an investigation to, e.g., expunge allegations that had emerged as being unfounded, it is 
clear that such changes can only be made “in favour of the undertaking concerned”.99  If the 
Commission wishes to raise new allegations, it is obliged to notify a supplementary statement of 
objection to the investigated parties.100 
           It should be emphasised that these principles, that have been developed in the context of the 
scrutiny of EU antitrust proceedings, have consistently been held to be applicable also to merger 
review cases, albeit by taking into account the significant differences in the nature of the scrutiny 
that the Commission conducts in merger as opposed to in cases relating to the enforcement of the 
EU antitrust rules.101  Consequently, questions may arise as to whether the rights of the notifying 
parties to be heard in the course of merger proceedings may have the same scope as those 
recognised to undertakings investigated for antitrust breaches: in particular, should the Commission 
issue a new statement of objections that reflects changes in its economic assessment of a 
concentration, perhaps by relying on a different model or methodology?  
          This question was central to the UPS appeal.  In 2013, after a full investigation conducted 
under Article 8 of the EU Merger Regulation, the Commission declared the merger between UPS and 
TNT, two major parcel delivery companies, incompatible with the internal market.102  UPS alleged 
that the Commission had infringed its rights of defence by adopting an econometric model that was 
substantially different from the one initially applied in the statement of its objections as to the 
legality of the concentration:103 since this model was materially divergent from the one notified to 
them, the merging parties could not challenge its reliability and appropriateness or indeed contest 
the results arising from its application and propose suitable commitments.104  In its defence the 
Commission argued that it was entitled to “revise or supplement the elements of fact or law” at 
issue in the course of the procedure, especially in light of the parties’ submissions.105 
         The General Court allowed the appeal.  It was confirmed that the right to be heard and 
generally, the rights of the defence formed part of the general principles of EU law and indeed of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU Charter and that accordingly the notified parties must be 
allowed “(…) the opportunity, during the administrative procedure, to make known its views on the 
truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the documents used by the 
Commission to support its claim.”106  On that basis, the observed that there were several “non-
negligible” discrepancies between the two models, including the use of different variables107 and the 
fact that reliance on the “new model” had led to different results and in particular to outcomes 
inconsistent with earlier allegations made by the Commission meant that the applicants had been 
deprived, by not knowing about the new methodology, to seek to disprove the findings contained in 
the decision.108  Importantly, the Court rejected the Commission’s plea that it would not have been 
possible to inform the parties of the new methodology due to the demands of speed characterising 
merger review: while it accepted that these demands should be taken into consideration while 
reviewing the overall fairness of the proceedings, it took the view that in the circumstances of the 
                                                          
99 Ibid.; see also, inter alia, joined cases 142/84 and 156/84, BAT and Reynolds v Commission, [1986] ECR 1899, 
para. 13. 
100
 See e.g. Commission Notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings under Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, [2011] OJ C308/6, para. 112-113. 
101 See Impala, cit. (fn. 77), para. 62; for commentary e.g., mutatis mutandis, Malinauskaite, “The failing firm 
defence in EU merger control: the story of Sisyphus?”, (2012) ICCLR 308, p. 312. 
102 Commission Decision C(2013) 431 of 20 January 2013,  case COMP/M.6570, UPS/TNT Express. 
103 Case T-194/13, UPS v Commission, judgment of 7 March 2017, not yet reported, para. 160-164. 
104 Id., para. 168-169. 
105 Id., para. 180-182; see also para. 175. 
106 Id., para. 199-200. 
107 Id., para. 205; see also para. 207-209. 
108 Id., para. 218-219. 
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case the passage of time would not have affected the ability of the Commission to notify the change 
to the parties, since the “econometric analysis was already very stable (…)” well ahead of a key 
meeting with them.109 
          In light of the foregoing, it is argued that the UPS case can be regarded both as a strong 
restatement of the central role of the rights of defence within the fabric of the EU general principles 
and as confirmation of their applicability to merger proceedings in a manner that is equivalent to the 
standards of protection in force for antitrust cases.  While the General Court acknowledged that 
demands typical of the control of concentrations, such as the need to complete the procedure 
within set deadlines, should be taken into account in assessing the existence of an infringement of 
these rights, it made clear that the merging entities are entitled to acquaint themselves with the 
Commission’s allegations and concerns as if they were being investigated for a breach of the 
competition rules.   
 
4.2. What is an “unreasonable time”? recent developments on the length of EU competition 
proceedings 
 
The EU Court of Justice has had the possibility to examine issues concerning the length of 
competition proceedings several times in the past 18 months in light of Article 47 of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, which expressly enshrines the right to obtain a decision “within a reasonable 
time”, whether a case is being investigated by the EU Commission or is sub judice following an 
appeal to the General Court.   In relation to the length of the administrative proceedings, in CEPSA 
the Court of Justice held that the infringement of the applicant’s right to obtain a decision by the EU 
Commission “within a reasonable period” could only lead to the annulment of the decision if it could 
have been demonstrated that the unacceptable delay had adversely affected the exercise of its 
rights of defence.110    
       In respect of the question of how the “unreasonableness” or otherwise of the delay should be 
assessed, the General Court confirmed in the Xellia decision, handed down in September 2016, that 
this appraisal should take into account “the particular circumstances of each case”, including the 
“background to the case, the various procedural steps, the complexity of the case” and its 
importance for the investigated parties.111  A distinction was drawn between the investigation of 
allegations of anti-competitive behaviour, namely the phase in which the EU Commission exercises 
its fact-finding powers and the administrative phase, which follows the issuing of the statement of 
objections.112   
          The General Court took the view that the “excessive duration” of the investigative phase could 
prejudice the ability of the investigated parties to exercise their rights of defence in the “formal” 
hearing, namely after the issuing of the statement of objections, thus justifying the conclusion that 
their entitlements under Article 47(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights had been 
infringed.113  Nonetheless, it made clear that in order to prove such breach the applicant should have 
demonstrated that it had experienced “significant difficulties in defending” him or herself from the 
Commission’s allegations, for instance because due to the delay it could no longer locate and access 
relevant documents which, in her view, were relevant and decisive for her defence.114   
          In light of these principles, the General Court examined the applicant’s arguments: it was 
observed that the Commission had adopted a decision after a period of, respectively, 7 years in total 
since the first investigative measure had been adopted vis-à-vis Xellia and one year and three 
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months since the issuing of the statement of objections:115  the investigation had been very complex, 
had been very complex, with the Commission making repeated requests for information and even 
conducting a market investigation before being able to formalise its accusations against the 
applicant and other companies active in the same market.116   
          Thus, in light of the features of the case and of the complexity of the procedural steps 
characterising it, the General Court concluded that there had been no infringement of the 
applicant’s rights under Article 47 CFR: 117 In its view, since there had been “no period of prolonged 
inactivity” on the part of the Commission in the course of such a complex procedure, the length of 
time necessary for the adoption of the decision could not have been regarded as “unreasonable”.118   
The Xellia judgment also clarified that the legal effect of the conclusion that the Commission had 
acted with unreasonable delay would have been the annulment of the infringement decision and 
not a reduction of the fines inflicted on the investigated companies.119  Although the Court 
acknowledged that it could, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, review the legality of the 
financial sanctions and, if required, substitute its own assessment of it, in light of a fresh 
appreciation of the gravity of the breach and after taking into account factors such as the conduct of 
the proceedings, it held that it was not under an obligation to do so, especially when, as in the case 
at hand, the Commission itself had reduced the fine to reflect the length of time it had taken to 
decide on the allegations.120  
          Recent judgments have also addressed allegations as to the breach of Article 47(2) CFR arising 
from the prima facie undue length of appeal proceedings pending before the General Court: in 
Proas, among others, the Court of Justice held that since proceedings had amounted to almost 5 
years and 9 months, with a very lengthy period of inactivity on the part of the General Court itself (4 
years and 2 months) which could not be justified “by either the nature or the complexity of the case 
or by its context”,121 the applicant rights under Article 47 CFR had been infringed.  It should however 
be emphasised that, as it emerges from this and other recent pronouncements, such as, among 
others the Villeroy and Boch122 and the Dornbracht123 appeal decisions, the consequences of a 
finding that it had been the inaction of the General Court, as opposed to that of the Commission, to 
lead to an infringement of the Article 47 rights are significantly different.   
           As the Court of Justice held in Dornbracht, the “sanction” for a breach of the principle that a 
judgment must be handed down “within a reasonable time” can only be “an action for damages 
brought before the General Court” lodged In accordance with the conditions laid out in Article 339 
TFEU. 124   In this specific context, it must be emphasised that the finding that there had been “undue 
delay” in adjudicating the appeal will constitute in itself a “sufficiently serious” breach of EU law for 
the purpose of establishing liability of the Union.125 In order to comply with principles of fairness, 
however, the General Court, before which this action must be brought, will hear that claim in a 
                                                          
115 Id., para. 361; see also para. 365. 
116 Id., para. 365. 
117 Id., para. 372. 
118 Id., para. 365; see also para. 368-369. 
119 Id., para. 372; see also para. 355.  See also, inter alia, case C-644/13, Villeroy and Boch SAS  v Commission, 
judgment of 26 January 2017, not yet reported, para. 79. 
120 Id., para. 373, 376. 
121 Case C-616/13 P, PROAS SA v Commission, judgment of 9 June 2016, not yet reported, para. 83-84. 
122 Case C-644/13, cit. (fn. 99), see e.g. para. 77-78. 
123 Case C-604/13 P, Dornbracht v Commission, judgment of 26 January 2017, not yet reported, see e.g. para. 
97-99. 
124 Id., para. 97. 




composition other than the one that was charged with the “dispute which gave rise to the procedure 
whose duration is criticised”.126 
            The above approach as regards the “policing” of undue delays in the adjudication of the EU 
Court of Justice may be usefully compared with the position of the European Court of Human Rights 
in similar cases.  According to the Strasbourg Court, the reasonableness of the duration of 
proceedings can only be assessed in light of the circumstances of the case at hand, of its 
complexities and of the conduct of the parties as well as of the competent court.127  In addition, for 
there to be compliance with the ECHR requirements, the applicant must have an “effective remedy” 
for the protection of his or her right to obtain justice within a “reasonable time”.128  In this specific 
context, the Human Rights Court held that while it is up to the contracting parties to identify and 
design a “remedy” for the infringement of this right, the former must be “effective in practice as well 
as in law” and therefore be capable of “dealing with the substance of an “arguable complaint” based 
on the ECHR and “to provide appropriate redress”.129  Thus, the Court accepted that, while an 
“effective remedy” could be “compensatory” as well as “preventive”, it should have been suitable, in 
any case, to “(…) either (…) preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or (…) providing 
adequate redress for any violation that had already occurred.”130   
          In light of the forgoing, it is concluded that the approach adopted by the EU Court of Justice in 
the Villeroy and Dornbracht decisions remains broadly compatible with the ECHR standards on the 
ground that applicants can seek compensation for any damage arising to them as a result of the 
undue length of judicial proceedings before the General Court by lodging an action in Luxembourg in 
accordance with Article 339 TFEU.131 
 
4.3. Reviewing competition fines: between legal certainty, deterrence and the right to equal 
treatment 
 
The scope and function of the judicial review powers enjoyed by the EU Court of Justice and 
especially by the General Court vis-à-vis competition infringement decisions has been at the 
forefront of the debate concerning the compliance of Union public enforcement with relevant 
human rights standards.  To what extent can the unlimited jurisdiction as regards the dimension of 
fines, coupled with the limited review as regards the substance of the decision, enjoyed by the 
General Court be regarded as providing a truly “fair trial” to the investigated parties? These issues 
are especially relevant when it comes to scrutinising the way in which the EU Commission 
ascertained the existence and consequently the applicability of aggravating and attenuating 
circumstances in complex cartel cases.  Applicants have often argued that the way in which the 
Commission did so did not conform to the principle of equal treatment, for instance by refusing to 
reduce a financial penalty when the cooperation offered was not regarded as sufficiently significant.   
         The Court of Justice held in the Repsol judgment, handed down in June 2016,132 that the “on-
the-merits” review of competition sanctions was an essential element of the right to the effective 
judicial protection, enshrined in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: thus, the 
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General Court is “bound (…) to examine all the complaints based on issues of fact and law which 
seek to show that the amount of the fine is not commensurate with the gravity and duration of the 
infringement”.133  The Court of Justice, on its part, is not empowered to “substitute, on grounds of 
fairness, its own assessment for that of the General Court” as regards these questions: unless it 
could be shown that the penalty being challenged was “not merely inappropriate but also excessive 
to the point of being disproportionate”, the Court of Justice would not rule that the judgment at first 
instance had been erroneous in law.134 
          In the Roca Sanitario judgment, delivered in January 2017, the Court of Justice had the 
opportunity to consider the related question of the scope of this unlimited jurisdiction vis-à-vis 
claims that the Commission’s fines had infringed the right to equal treatment.  The Court of Justice 
reiterated that this constituted a general principle of Union law as a result of which a fine imposed 
for the breach of the competition rules should be determined in a way that does not discriminate 
between undertakings that have participated in the same infringement unless a difference in their 
treatment can be objectively justified.135  The Court acknowledged that the sanction imposed on the 
members of the same cartel could well differ in light of the way in which each was involved in the 
practice, of the “economic significance” of the breach and of the contribution that each member 
made it—a contribution that could be measured, inter alia, on the basis of the “value of sales” made 
by every infringer as a result of the illegal practice.136 
            However, the Court, dismissing the appeal, held that the Commission was under no obligation 
to take into account the differing manner of involvement of each firm at a particular stage of the 
procedure—for instance, while quantifying the “basic amount” of the penalty.137  It was held that the 
Commission could rely on a number of tools for this purpose: these included not just the 
“multipliers” reflecting the gravity and duration of the infringement, which in accordance with the 
Commission’s Fining Guidelines affected directly the sanction’s “base line”,138 the application of the 
“aggravating” and “attenuating circumstances” that may be relevant in light of the features of the 
case and, finally, the “multiplying factor” aimed at reflecting the need to deter future 
infringements.139   
       A similar approach was also applied in the Dornbracht judgment: the Court of Justice first 
confirmed that “the conduct of each of the undertakings”, the [part they played in the restrictive 
practice, “the profit which they were able to derive from it, their size, the value of the goods 
concerned” and the extent to which the breach threatened the EU’s objectives should all play a part 
in determining the size of the fine inflicted on each cartel member.140  On that basis it rejected the 
applicant’s argument that its right to equal treatment had been infringed.  The Court held that the 
simple fact that the “multipliers” that reflected the gravity of the breach and in particular its scope 
had been set at the same rate for all participants, even for those whose role had had a larger 
geographic impact, could not be regarded on its own as being incompatible with this principle.141  In 
its view, “the taking into account (…) of the differences between the undertakings that have 
participated in a cartel (…) need not necessarily occur when the multipliers (…) are set” but could 
have occurred at another stage in the process for the determination of the penalties to be applied to 
each cartel participant.142 
                                                          
133 Id., para. 86. 
134 Id., para. 82; see also para. 81.  See also, more recently, inter alia, case C-636/13, Roca Sanitario v 
Commission, judgment of 26 January 2017, not yet reported, para. 46-47. 
135 Case C-636/13, cit. (fn. 114), para. 57. 
136 Id., para. 59-60.  
137 Id., para. 61, 63. 
138 Id., para. 67-68.  See Commission Guidelines on the method of setting of fines in accordance with Article 
23(3) of Council Regulation No 1/2003, [2006] OJ C210/2, para. 19-22, 25. 
139 Case C-636/13, cit. (fn. 114), para. 59-60; see also para. 63, 70-72. 
140 Case C-604/13 P, cit. (fn. 103), para. 68. 
141 Id., para. 75-76. 
142 Id., para. 78-79. 
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          It must be emphasised that a similar approach has also influenced the General Court’s review 
of decisions granting full or partial immunity from fines following the filing of leniency applications.  
In, among others, the Deutsche Bahn decision,143 the General Court confirmed that it had jurisdiction 
to assess whether, as a result of an application for leniency, the information obtained by the 
Commission “would have enabled [it] (…) to carry out a targeted inspection in connection with an 
alleged cartel.”144 
           On that basis, the Court rejected the allegation that the Commission had wrongfully granted 
partial immunity to the applicant: it took the view that contrary to the allegations made on appeal, 
the information obtained was capable of “(…) providing reasonable grounds for suspecting the 
existence of an infringement”.145   Importantly, the General Court emphasised that the fact that the 
General Court enjoyed “unlimited jurisdiction” vis-à-vis the review of competition fines allowed it to 
order the submission of and to evaluate the information originally submitted by the leniency 
applicants to the Commission, so as to satisfy itself that the latter had correctly applied the rules 
enshrined in its Leniency policy.146   
        In light of the foregoing analysis it may be concluded that the General Court, thanks to its 
unlimited jurisdiction, has held the Commission to stringent standards of legality as regards the 
quantification of the fines to be imposed on individual infringers: whether by adjudicating on 
appeals concerning complex, multi-party cases, or by reviewing the way in which whistleblowers had 
been “rewarded” for their cooperation, the Court has ensured that the Commission practice would 
be predictable and consistent with the principle of proportionality in the determination of fines.   
 
4.4. Settlement procedure and the rights of the investigated undertakings: the Timab appeal 
 
The settlement procedure, disciplined by Article 9 of Council regulation No 1/2003, represents 
another effective tool through which the EU Commission can seek to bring competition 
infringements to an end.    In the Timab appeal decision, handed down in May 2015,147 the General 
Court had been faced with the question of what the consequences are of an “aborted settlement” 
for the undertaking or undertakings involved in the discussions: would it be contrary to the principle 
of equal treatment if the Commission, after some but not all the participants to a complex cartel had 
withdrawn from negotiations, proceeded to inflict sanctions on the former that were markedly 
different from either the fines predicted in the course of the settlement process or those later 
inflicted on the settling undertakings?148   
            The General Court had taken the view that it would not be incompatible with this general 
principle of EU law if the Commission had imposed a “higher fine than the one with which it had (…) 
threatened” the applicant during the discussions149 on the ground that in an “ordinary” infringement 
procedure the Commission was not bound by the initial “offer of a settlement” but only by the 
statement of objections which did not contemplate any indications as regards the sanctions that the 
investigated undertaking could expect150 and therefore  retained its usual discretion as regards the 
setting of the fine to be inflicted on the applicant.151  The Court also rejected the allegation that the 
infringement decision had been adopted in defiance of the right against self-incrimination: in its 
                                                          
143 Case T-267/12, Deutsche Bahn v Commission, judgment of 29 February 2016. 
144 Id., para. 315. 
145 Id., para. 318. 
146 Id., para. 392-393. 
147 Case T-456/10, Timab and another v Commission, [2015] ECR II-296. 
148 See para, 72; see also para. 80-81. 
149 Bombois and Oliver, Competition and Fundamental Rights, (2016) 7(10) JECLAP 711 at 721; see Timab, cit. 
(fn. 127), para. 105; see also para. 67-68. 
150 Timab, cit. (fn. 127), para. 96, 98-99; see also para. 120. 
151 Id., para. 100; see also para. 122. 
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view, the voluntary nature of the settlement procedure could not be affected by the later 
withdrawal of an undertaking from the negotiations.152     
              In its January 2017 decision the Court of Justice confirmed the first instance judgment:153 in 
respect of the argument that the applicant’s right not to incriminate oneself had been infringed, the 
Court reiterated that due to the voluntary nature of the “cooperation” that engaging in settlement 
discussions entailed, the Commission had been entitled to take into account the applicant’s 
proposals for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of a breach and of determining the sanction 
for it.154  In its view, the absence of any “compulsion” on the applicant meant that the privilege 
against self-incrimination would not be applicable.155  The appeal judgment also confirmed that the 
applicant’s right to equal treatment had not been infringed: it was held that once Timab had 
withdrawn from the settlement negotiations, the procedure had followed the ordinary rules for 
infringement proceedings and that in that context the Commission had fully respected the 
applicant’s due process rights.156  As regards the size of the fine inflicted on the applicant, the Court 
reiterated that, following the withdrawal from negotiations, the Commission’s discretion was 
subjected to the rules enshrined in Article 23 of Council Regulation No 1/2003, as interpreted, inter 
alia, in light of the “ordinary” fining guidelines, and was no longer bound to any estimate that it may 
have offered as part of the settlement discussions.157           
          It is suggested that the Timab appeal is very likely to have a significant impact on the legal 
approach to the nature of the settlement procedure as well as on the scope of the right against self-
incrimination.  Having regard to the former issue, it is clear from the Court of Justice’s conclusions 
that the negotiation of a settlement must be kept separate from the infringement decision.  Thus, 
while the interruption of discussions between investigated firms and the Commission may lead to 
the initiation of a “normal” enforcement procedure, the Commission, once this occurs, is no longer 
bound either to maintaining its “promises” concerning the likely amount of any fines it may impose 
on the undertakings or to taking into account the sanctions envisaged for other cartel members who 
may have chosen to continue negotiation and thereby to secure a settlement.158  As to the Court of 
Justice’s conclusions as regards the reach if the right not to incriminate oneself, it emerges from this 
decision that under EU competition law the offering of commitments is treated as a form of 
“cooperation” with the Commission, along the lines of, e.g., the submission of a leniency application.  
Thus, it should be emphasised that so long as this is done voluntarily, the right in question will not 
apply, regardless of whether commitments are actually entered into or whether the Commission, 
following the interruption of discussions with the investigated party, decides to pursue an ordinary 
infringement case.   
            It is acknowledged that this approach remains broadly compatible with, inter alia, the one 
adopted by the European Court of Human Rights as regards the compliance of national plea-
bargaining procedures with Article 6 ECHR: it was held in, inter alia, the Natvlishvili decision that the 
right to a fair trial does not prevent an accused from waiving some of his or her procedural rights 
voluntarily,159 so long as  the waiver was entirely voluntary, entered into “in an unequivocal manner 
and (…) attended by minimum safeguards” as well as not running contrary to important public 
interests.160    Nonetheless, whereas it could be argued that the investigated firm had been duly 
                                                          
152 Id., para. 76-79; see also para. 120. 
153 Case C-411/15P, Timab v Commission, [2017] ECR I-11. 
154 Id., para. 84, 87. 
155 Id., para. 86. 
156 Id., para. 136; see also para. 139. 
157 Id., para. 140; see also para. 153, 158. 
158 See mutatis mutandis, Timab (General Court judgment), cit. (fn. 127), para. 80-82; also for commentary 
Bombois et al., cit. (fn. 129), p. 721. 
159 Appl. No. 9043/05, Natvlishvili v Georgia, judgment of 29 April 2014, available at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-142672; see para. 91-92. 
160 Ibid.; see also para. 93. 
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served with a statement of objections and had been able to put forward its defence to the 
Commission’s allegations, it may be objected that drawing such a stark distinction between Article 9 
proceedings and an ordinary infringement case appears formalistic, to the point of potentially being 
inconsistent with the need to protect effectively the undertakings’ rights of the defence.   
 
5. Competition enforcement and fundamental rights—a year in review 
 
The past 18 months have seen a good level of judicial activity in respect of questions arising from the 
interplay between fundamental rights’ protection and the enforcement of the EU competition rules.  
While these judgments have addressed an array of issues, it is apparent that some common themes 
emerge: these are, among others, the interpretation of the right to a “fair hearing” and to a decision 
within a “reasonable time”, both at administrative and, perhaps more importantly, at judicial level, 
the ongoing debate on whether and at what conditions members of the same corporate group as a 
competition infringer should be held responsible for the latter’s illegal conduct and whether, more 
generally, there may be other cases in which the requirement that liability for antitrust breaches be 
“personal” could be waived, as envisaged in the E-Turas case.  The scope of the right no to 
incriminate oneself and the complex impact of the functioning of the ECN on due process standards, 
as well as how the demands of effective enforcement can be reconciled with the recognised need 
for well-functioning leniency programmes were also examined. 
           While it is difficult to draw unitary conclusions from the above, it is submitted that the EU 
Court of Justice has been rather proactive in linking the interpretation of the single “components” of 
the right to a “fair hearing”, even in a composite procedure such as the one for the enforcement of 
the EU competition rules, to the overarching provisions of Articles 41 and 47 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, namely the right to “good administration” and to an effective remedy and a fair 
trial, as well as to the observance of other key principles, such as the right to equal treatment.  It is 
therefore expected that as similar issues continue to emerge, the Commission’s practice will be 
subjected to painstaking scrutiny to ensure the full respect of the Union’s human rights standards. 
 
 
